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“THERENESS”
Implications of Heidegger’s “presence” for Mäori
Carl Te Hira Mika*
Abstr act
For Mäori, the philosophical consequences of colonization are a hugely important issue, due to 
both the subtlety and the omnipresence of Western metaphysics. In this article I refer to the “meta-
physics of presence” through one major Western thinker—Martin Heidegger—who identifi ed 
“presence” as a problem for the West. He proposes that the metaphysics of presence underpins 
every perception in the West and that it is the fundamental mistake of philosophers since Plato 
but becoming ascendant with Aristotle. I identify the points of relevance within their claims and 
refer them to a Mäori understanding of absence. I also consider the more affective nature of 
Western presence, which Heidegger refers to but which must be theorized by Mäori. In the fi rst 
instance I place particular emphasis on the ironies implicit in writing about metaphysics for the 
Mäori writer in the academy and for the things being represented in that writing. Finally, the 
metaphysics of presence opens up possibilities for its own instability; this Heideggerean “saving 
power” is discussed in Mäori terms.
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Introduction
In indigenous forums, one commonly hears talk 
of a Western tendency to fragment the world, to 
think of the world as inanimate, and to dispel 
any fearful discussions about mythical think-
ing. These concerns appear to be at the base 
of Western thought, but in fact they disclose 
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something much more fundamental. At the 
very foundation of these worries is a unifying 
metaphysics that Fuchs (1976) describes as pos-
sibly “the oldest and most dominant trend in 
the history of western philosophical thinking” 
(pp. 3–4), one that rests on the assumption 
of the thoroughgoing presence of something. 
Heidegger identifi es this concern early on in his 
writing and calls this “metaphysics”, as short-
hand for a ground of ontological assumption 
that underpins all thinking and conceptions in 
the West and that prefers the presence of an 
object. He saw it becoming especially evident in 
Aristotle and its manifestation in how an object 
would be thought of as this or that, in advance. 
Although philosophy has been at the forefront 
of active thought, he argues that its ability to 
contemplate its own self- suffi ciency, and hence 
its own limitation, is compromised by its urge to 
replicate itself as a logical and rational orienta-
tion towards things in the world.
For Mäori, the purely yet socially related 
philosophical repercussions of colonization 
have yet to be fully speculated on. I raise the 
issue of Heidegger’s “metaphysics of presence” 
here to consider how it may have diffused itself 
throughout our representation of things in the 
world—or, at least, to theorize about how we 
have been relentlessly encouraged to represent 
things in the world in line with that metaphys-
ics. I propose that Heidegger sketches a useful 
critique for a Mäori approach to a problem 
that colonization itself does not want us to 
think about, and discuss in his wake the hidden 
relations to things. I also describe the paradox 
of even writing about this problem as a Mäori 
writer within academic text, and conclude by 
suggesting, albeit briefl y, that there is a poetics 
that runs counter to the metaphysics of pres-
ence which may provide some respite from its 
overwhelming demands.
Addressing the ultimate ground: 
Heidegger’s metaphysics of presence
Mäori (and indeed the West) have long been 
forced to participate in a project that stresses 
the clear, unequivocal and detached represen-
tation of an object. In a social or postcolonial 
sense, this decree runs counter to the reality 
of indigenous experiences which need to be 
expressed in their lived, emotional breadth 
(Koptie, 2009). A pursuit towards the single 
identity of a thing, however, is not necessarily 
an indigenous or Mäori one; moreover, it has a 
long and privileged genealogy in the West. For 
those reasons alone, the relentless call to focus 
on one object, rather than “trying to understand 
the full context of things” (Fixico, 2003, p. 2), 
could be challenged on a number of theoretical 
grounds within a particular discipline. Here, 
the discussion takes a turn towards the meta-
physical, because it is the most initial ground 
of perception that gives rise to the belief that 
clarity can be obtained. This originary cause 
needs to be challenged as a founding problem 
of colonisation, even if, as Kant would have 
it, it cannot ultimately be known. It may be 
necessary for Mäori to employ various tools to 
excavate into this particular ground.
The German philosopher Heidegger is con-
cerned with the corrosion of Western thought 
to what is thoroughly “there”. In this respect, 
he is useful for those indigenous writers who 
are interested in critiquing a most complex 
and originary problem that started in the West 
and may have infiltrated indigenous modes 
of representation of the world. “Metaphysics 
of presence” is a phrase fi rst used by Derrida 
(1982) but it was identifi ed conceptually at an 
earlier stage in Heidegger’s works. According 
to Heidegger, Western philosophy has estab-
lished a mode of perception that relies on Being 
as a present revelation. Because Being knows 
no limits (apart from “nonbeing” [Fuchs, 
1976, p. 7]) and is thoroughly present, only 
that which is in the “here and now” partici-
pates in Being. That is, only an entity that is 
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present is a manifestation of Being. Moreover, 
and more importantly for my interrogation, 
Being is utterly positive and exclusive of what 
is not present. Thus, as Fuchs continues, “that 
which was, for example, is given in the mode 
of having- been”. Our immediate thinking of an 
idea is evidence of the presence of Being. Truth 
is then seen as a manifestation of presence. To 
exemplify what it means, Peller (1985) provides 
an example of a tree:
In the metaphysics of presence, meaning is ulti-
mately determinate and positive. The concept 
tree, for example, is believed to refer to some 
self- present source—“it’s really out there”—so 
that the concept is differentiated from other 
concepts not by merely being different from 
them. Instead, a plenitude, a substantiality of 
being is assumed to fi ll up the realm of treeness. 
This plenitude then pushes other concepts 
out of the realm by giving positive content 
to the concept “tree.” Language or thought 
re- presents the self- present source. (p. 1169) 
Heidegger, like Peller, takes a bold step and 
deliberately moves the issue beyond the mere 
abstract. The metaphysics of presence is the 
ultimate fixation of the West and is largely 
inescapable in all its current forms of language 
and concept. Mäori vigilance at this point may 
be drawn to how the West requires Mäori 
individuals to both perceive and represent an 
object in its most basic sense. When a phenom-
enon such as whenua (land) is to be discussed, 
for example, then dominant Western practice 
encourages us, even in that briefest moment of 
our attention to it, to apprehend it as whenua 
and nothing else. This representation appears to 
be straightforward but from a Mäori worldview 
it may constrict whenua in its essential whole-
ness, not just our perception of it. In that sheer, 
fl eeting instant, whenua becomes a product of 
“thereness”: it is communicable as a smooth 
and unproblematic entity.
We can glean some background detail for 
this deep Western tendency in Heidegger’s 
discussion of Aristotle. For Heidegger it is ulti-
mately Aristotle who reifi es a thing in light of 
its properties. Aristotle gave rise to the idea 
that a thing is present as a set of components. 
Nature itself is confused with artefact and so 
becomes thought of as something formed by 
an artist (Glazebrook, 2000), rather than that 
which was earlier believed to come to presence 
through the original sense of phusis (to spring 
forth). Aristotle, the forefather of modern sci-
ence, encourages a thing to be known in advance 
as this- or- that. In other words, we approach 
nature already knowing the things that lie in it: 
here Heidegger refers to the ancient Greek term 
for “mathematical” (μαθηματα/mathemata) 
and argues that humanity has already posit-
 ed the appearance of things. Science is hence 
posit- ivist. It is in relation to Aristotle that 
Heidegger (1967a) coins the phrase “present 
at hand” and draws an association between 
modern man’s tendency to identify with the 
idea of what is utterly there and an entity that 
becomes an object of theoretical considera-
tion. This is “a derivative kind of encounter” 
(Wheeler, 2014, n.p.) in which an entity is con-
templated in its conscious distinction from other 
things. Wheeler explains that Aristotle had laid 
the foundation for this thinking by proposing 
that “every meaningful appearance of beings 
involves an event in which a human being takes a 
being as”. Knowing that a thing can be taken as 
this or that in advance has preoccupied Western 
humanity’s orientation towards the world. Just 
as importantly, it limits the potential of Western 
thought. With the push to posit a thing as a 
“thorough” entity in its visibility, according to 
Heidegger, Western thought lost its ability to 
refl ect in an authentic manner.
While I am loath to reduce the scope of this 
problem to Western institutions—after all, 
it may play out also in the most private and 
individual moments and dialogues—I have 
observed that it is particularly prized in those 
formal settings. Returning to our example of 
whenua: in the Waitangi Tribunal, which is 
a Western body set up to hear Mäori claims 
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against the Crown, Mäori notions of things (but 
also that initial Mäori orientation towards an 
object that I have just spoken of) are reduced 
to manageable entities. If I am asked to provide 
evidence about a block of land, I am asked to 
do something even before I talk about land 
itself: I am asked to take on a notion of an 
object as utterly undistracted or uninformed 
by other objects. I turn to that object with the 
expectation that it will fulfi l its role as an object. 
Then my attention turns to whenua. I represent 
whenua on the basis of that assumption of the 
nature of an object. Whenua as a phenomenon 
then has no relationship with other entities 
for that short time. In relation to that second 
stage—where one discusses whenua as whenua 
with clarity—Park (2006) identifi es that “the 
grievous losses that Mäori have suffered since 
the treaty, while sited in the solid surface of the 
Earth that we call ‘land’, have been much more 
than the loss of ground” (p. 242). Whenua thus 
potentially concludes by illuminating no more 
in the world than “land”. We can see here a 
peculiar assumption about language, where 
terms reduce two different things to refer eas-
ily to each other. Language itself, a product 
of the presence that Heidegger warns against, 
is a crucial element in the representation of 
the thing as highly present. Te reo Mäori acts 
in these instances in concert with a Western 
expectation that whenua be depicted as a highly 
positive and articulable “thing”. Similarly, in 
colonizing discourse about Mäori, language is 
predetermined to meet that broad expectation 
of presence; examples of this fi xity occur in such 
terms as “tangata” which will preferably mean 
“him” (Pihama, 2001) and also “ia” which 
will conform with the anticipated equivalent 
of “him” or “her” (Mikaere, 1994). 
Language in itself: Everyday 
representation
Let us consider language as an actual phenom-
enon, however, and move away from linguistic 
examples of colonizing discourse. Here we 
are talking about language in and of itself. 
Language through the metaphysics of presence 
is meant to be purely a communicative device. 
Where Jeffries and Kennedy (2008) argue for 
the deeper aspects within Mäori language as 
“manifestations … of the intrinsic relationship 
between tangata whenua … and the rest of 
the natural world” (p. 10), the metaphysics of 
presence assigns it a particular role: to talk with 
ease about a phenomenon at any one particular 
time. Language itself in this sense is no other 
entity apart from linguistic. It is made to bolster 
Western humanity’s “fascination with episte-
mology” (Guignon, 1983, p. 13) and to have 
value through its ability to point clearly at an 
entity. Despite “a piece of writing or a speech … 
[having] its own mauri” (Smith, 2000, p. 43), 
language is viewed as merely a useful tool at 
one’s disposal. With this intangible colonization 
that I have discussed in mind, one may suspect 
that the very initial stages of Mäori creation, 
for instance, which are often cited in various 
academic texts, have been made into complete 
and self- suffi cient phenomena. They are present 
entities in that they are brought out as distinct 
ideas that encompass distinct things. In that act, 
which engages with some of our most original 
entities, language refers to those things in that 
vein and is posed as an object.
Yet a Mäori inquiry into language might 
indeed show that it is a phenomenon within 
which one operates, not a useful entity that one 
draws on as a user. Language, as Heidegger 
(1978) has it, is “appropriated by Being and 
pervaded by Being” (p. 237); it is grandly the 
“house of Being” (p. 217). For Mäori, language 
would have us; we do not, fi rst and foremost, 
have language. Language in the colonial sense, 
though, is already opened up as a highly visible 
entity that is at our behest. Another problem 
arises here for the Mäori critic, which I return 
to later: the language of this sort of representa-
tion does not allow a critique of itself. It cannot 
“get at itself”. Mäori academic Sheilagh Walker 
(1996) cites a “spiritual disease” and terms 
it “internalisation of colonisation” (p. 122), 
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which is relevant for our discussion because 
colonization can take the form of preventing 
us from voicing a deep problem through con-
ventional language. Prescribed language forces 
one’s attention to what lies immediately before 
the self, even if it is an idea, but it also pre-
vents refl ection on itself. We are left with sheer 
speculation to deal with the possibilities of that 
colonial metaphysics as it involves Mäori, with 
the language we use to do so working against us.
The prospect that an object can be discussed 
with fi nality hence plays an important part with 
presence, and arguably Mäori terms recoil from 
its infl uence. My suggestion here that language 
itself can react is not accidental, because it is 
commonly cited by Mäori that language has 
its own spiritual essence (Browne, 2005; Pere, 
1982). Hence even “kaupapa”, which is often 
thought of as a type of crux, refers to a hid-
denness of a fi nal ground because it signifi es 
quite obscurely an initial disclosure of that 
fi nality—Papatüänuku (Earth Mother). Royal 
(2000) explains the signifi cance of “kau” as 
“appearance”. It is certainly a term that has 
meaning in a rational sense, but equally it is 
an ontological one because it suggests that the 
self can comport itself towards that ground 
but not arrive at it with total self- assuredness. 
“Papatüänuku” is innate to the term, through 
its “papa” component, and by its own “fl aring 
up” adds a tinge of mystery and vitality—to 
both the situation in which it is uttered and the 
utterer. “Kaupapa”, along with other Mäori 
terms, contains to itself its own independent yet 
relational activity; moreover, the self is called to 
enter into that activity in its own uncertainty.
The inescapable metaphysics of 
presence: The irony for the self
Heidegger (1971) asserts that “it is language that 
tells us about the nature of a thing, provided that 
we respect language’s own nature” (p. 146). 
The idea that language is merely a way of con-
veying intellectual meaning runs counter to that 
other view of language Heidegger is proposing. 
Although the self- evidence that he alludes to 
here might also display itself for Mäori in carv-
ing and weaving, it is most clear in language 
because language is the most common (but, 
again, not universal) form of communication. In 
rational, academic writing, the expectation that 
a thing will be represented clearly takes prior-
ity, leading Heidegger to deliberately resort to 
more cloaked, even obscure, language. Even in 
asserting that there are problems concerning 
the rational representation of the self, one is 
forced to resort to rationalism’s tools, and there 
are certainly diffi culties that lie in wait here for 
the Mäori academic writer in particular. After 
all, in describing the diffi culties that I go on to 
discuss in this very article, I am coming to a con-
clusion about metaphysics. I am thus professing 
to explain the metaphysics of presence, and am 
thereby a victim of the metaphysics of presence. 
This, according to my own speculation, creates 
a paradox for me.
When discussing colonial attempts to block 
Mäori speculation on metaphysics generally, it 
is the relegation of Mäori metaphysics “to the 
fl ames” (Hume, 1902, p. 165) that I am mainly 
concerned with, although a Mäori metaphysics 
could only be immolated because of a perva-
sive disregard of mystery to begin with. The 
Western trajectory of thought that has resulted 
in such a strong focus on presence represents 
such an extreme concern for Heidegger that 
he says bluntly, “the forgottenness of Being 
is the forgottenness of the difference between 
Being and beings” (Heidegger, 2003, p. 364). 
Modern philosophy is largely to blame here, and 
Heidegger’s resistance to what he tacitly sees as 
the comfort felt by contemporary philosophers 
may serve also as a warning for the indigenous 
writer. It is the nature of this disturbing bequest 
for Mäori, who continue to be colonized by that 
inheritance of “sheer thinking” (Bowers, 2007, 
p. 8), which arguably threatens a Mäori inquiry 
into any original laws of mystery. Ahekanew, 
Andreotti, Cooper and Hireme (2014) state 
that one remains, because of modernity, within 
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the linguistic, epistemological and ontological 
realm of Western thought, despite one’s efforts 
against that. Their argument can be transported 
into the area of metaphysics. Here, if Mäori 
are to think of metaphysics as mysterious at 
all, then such thinking should only centre on a 
rarefi ed study of a set of laws. The laws them-
selves are not phenomena that have a material 
impact on anything. 
If this were not complicated enough, as a 
Mäori writer engaging in philosophy I am pro-
posing a relationship between self, thin g and 
metaphysics which is not the innocent, solely 
intellectual exercise that the West insists it is. 
Marsden (1985) argues that the certainty of 
perception is counter to a more contradictory 
Mäori apprehension, with “abstract rational 
thought and empirical methods [not being able 
to] grasp the concrete act of existing [for Mäori] 
which is fragmentary, paradoxical and incom-
plete” (p. 163). Marsden’s use of the word 
“abstract” poses a conundrum for the Mäori 
writer because he or she might be forced to 
engage with highly abstract principles in order 
to understand and refl ect on the vagaries of colo-
nization, despite certain problems innate to that 
exercise. If this is the case, then the challenge for 
the Mäori writer generally will be to describe 
or talk objectively about the phenomena—we 
might metaphorically say “rise above and gaze 
down upon them”—while ensuring that he or 
she, the writer, remain related to those phenom-
ena through whakapapa (genealogy). This edict 
is a metaphysical one, and requires no mean feat 
of judgement, given the necessary rationalism of 
the academy. Alongside the fact that Western 
metaphysics separates out disciplines according 
to Aristotle’s categorization (Wildcat, 2001a), 
or dichotomizes between religion and science 
and thus spirituality and logical truth, it also 
distinguishes between things as the basis of 
its rationality. This is perhaps at the root of 
the metaphysics that Wildcat addresses, and 
may prove to be the greatest challenge to a 
Mäori holistic metaphysical approach to things. 
A Mäori representation of an entity should 
ethically depict staying with that entity as active 
interpretation of whakapapa (Mika, 2014), 
thus ensuring that both the self and those things 
retain their connection with each other and 
their own inherent integrity.
I suspect that a curious paradox therefore 
opens up for the Mäori philosophical writer, 
who may set out to address colonization using 
rational language but is also responsible for 
apprehending things in their full obscurity and 
then describing them in that vein. A ration-
alistic view of the world is therefore not one 
thoroughly privileged by the indigenous writer. 
Yet quite simply the academy demands the 
presentation of a rational argument. For the 
indigenous writer, I assert, this poses not just 
a theoretical problem but more importantly a 
constitutional or bodily one, if we are to allow 
for an holistic argument that proposes that writ-
ing itself has a deeper impact on the self, as well 
as what is written about, than we realize. The 
form of colonization that a rational ordering 
of things in the world requires, so that those 
things can then be written about, is quite often 
at the forefront of indigenous concern due to 
the constricting nature of the exercise. Thus the 
split between the metaphorical and the literal 
that Cajete (2000) identifi es as having occurred 
in Western society is also one that threatens the 
indigenous writer as he or she thinks and writes. 
Writing within (but against) the 
metaphysics of presence
What consequences does all this have for the 
Mäori self, and his or her wellbeing? Edwards 
(2005) raises the issue in light of Heidegger’s 
insistence that we have become conditioned by 
the metaphysics of presence. That is, in stating 
whenua as an utterly there phenomenon, we 
are doing the same to ourselves. In respect of 
Heidegger, Edwards (2005) notes this problem 
in the following terms:
And when I conceive of myself as uncon-
ditional, or as conditioned only by myself 
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(ethically, they come to the same thing), I am 
cut free of everything that might actually mat-
ter to me, except myself … a kind of radical 
egoism [is produced]. (p. 465)
In practice, traditional notions of selfhood as 
largely submerged within, and often eclipsed 
by, other things are threatened, with the Mäori 
self forced to be present in its bodily entirety 
in various institutions, including educational, 
judicial (Mika, 2007) and medical. Ways of 
expression have to agree with the highly visible: 
one is questioned in a court, is asked to provide 
information about one’s tribe in government 
departments, and is asked to write an essay, 
and is only acknowledged if one’s answers 
are logical. In that light, answers correspond 
directly to questions, one’s tribe is brought into 
glaring focus, and the writing of an essay has to 
draw on what was established truth and must 
be on guard against irrational representations 
of phenomena.
In philosophical work it is common for 
the philosopher “to return to the beginning 
moments of his [or her] own philosophic work” 
(Fuchs, 1976, p. 2), as if one can identify one’s 
own self with complete assuredness. For the 
indigenous person, though, the self is not so con-
cretely identifi able by the self. In other words, 
the self does not represent or replicate him or 
herself for his or her own detached speculation. 
This difference between Western and Mäori 
notions of the self opens onto wider specula-
tion about time and space, for the Western 
tradition would have it, à la Descartes, that 
the self perceives itself because the self is think-
ing. Mäori self- perception, on the other hand, 
is dependent on the materiality (not neces-
sarily the visible presence) of other things in 
the world, such as maunga (mountains), awa 
(rivers) and so on. In other words, as I pro-
pose that I am from a particular iwi (tribe), for 
instance, my utterance is rendered essentially 
uncertain by the nature of all things that come 
to bear on me in that saying. Thus, an asser-
tion that the self makes is tempered by the very 
materiality of other things that are altogether 
veiled.
The activity of writing is therefore fraught 
due to its potential for the writer. The indige-
nous writer (and other writers) is located within 
the sphere of thinking and writing rather than 
somehow transcendent to it, even if he or she is 
gazing down dispassionately upon the subject 
matter to discuss it rationally. Thinking in any 
one particular way has consequences beneath 
just the intellectual reception of text on the 
part of the audience, as Royal (2005) points 
out when discussing the frontal sensory realm 
(aroaro) of the body:
texts—and latterly screens—serve to narrow 
the aroaro. Consider what happens to our 
bodies when we spend some time either read-
ing texts or sitting in front of a screen. This 
experience, the physical position, narrows and 
sharpens the aroaro. The more time and the 
more often we do this, the more the aroaro 
becomes fi xed in a certain shape and the less 
“omni- directional” we become. (p. 16)
It could be argued that the representation of 
something based on its positivity divorces the 
self from other things in the world and runs 
counter to the integrity of a thing under regard. 
Any proposition about the world also relates to 
the wellbeing of the thinking and writing Mäori 
self. Wildcat suggests that the consequences of 
not retaining this admittedly complex activity 
are dire for those in the sciences. Although 
Wildcat (2001b) intends to focus on the sci-
ences here, I would extend his argument to the 
more primordial Western metaphysics of clarity 
in general:
We are surrounded by a society of metaphysi-
cal schizophrenics: people who do not see the 
phenomenal world for what it is—a living, 
complex reality with multiple dimensions. 
A good number of these metaphysical schiz-
ophrenics are scientists and engineers who 
have, with considerable harm to their person 
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(or personality) as human beings, convinced 
themselves that their feelings or emotions have 
no place in their objective science. (p. 116) 
The differences for indigenous peoples generally, 
between the Western notion of schizophrenia 
on the one hand and indigenous perspectives 
on spiritual apprehension on the other, are vast 
and are beyond the scope of this article. We may 
take from the above assertion of Wildcat’s that, 
in this case, schizophrenia is a problem, and that 
it can be metaphysical, or prior to one’s overt 
behaviour and thus be unseen. There is a bodily 
price to be paid if this reading of schizophrenia 
is correct. One could argue that it is not just the 
pure sciences that effect this loss of wellbeing: 
it is a general adherence to a metaphysics “in 
which the origin itself is designated as pure, 
simple, normal, standard, self- suffi cient and 
self- identical” (Biesta, 2010, p. 75). 
Disturbing the metaphysics of 
presence: Counter- colonial poetics
Perhaps the metaphysics of presence, however, 
can be momentarily disturbed. In conjunction 
with his critique, Heidegger (1967b) argues 
that a crucial questioning of Being has been 
ignored in favour of the study of highly evident 
beings and their truthfulness. In pre- Socratic 
approaches, Being was favoured as a process 
within which one inquired; one operated at 
all times as part of the revealing and conceal-
ing nature of Being and was thus preoccupied 
with its possibilities. This misunderstanding 
of Being, however, that became clearest with 
Aristotle “has been unable to radically pose 
what Heidegger calls the ‘basic question’ or 
‘fundamental question’ (Grundfrage) of philos-
ophy” in that “it has never really inquired into 
the origin of its own ‘rationality’” (Backman, 
2005, pp. 175–176). Heidegger offers a solu-
tion when he says that the poet “harnesses the 
lightning fl ashes of the God, compelling them 
into the word, and places this lightning- charged 
word into the language of his people” (cited in 
McNeill, 2013, p. 227), suggesting that it was 
not logical discourse that equipped a thing to 
manifest in its own way and in its own time.
By “poetics”, Heidegger (1971) means a 
kind of thinking that is at once critical and 
anticipatory. He calls this “meditative think-
ing”, but we should be careful not to construe 
“meditative” as “transcendental”. On the con-
trary, meditative thinking is tinged with both 
rational and emotional speculation. Heidegger 
calls for thought that accounts for a Destruktion 
(destruction) of ontological assumptions as 
well as an anticipatory prospect of “dwell-
ing” among things in the world (Heidegger, 
1971). What is important for Heidegger, in a 
questioning of both a problem and a prospect, 
is the need for renewed refl ection on Being—
how one is thrown into the world in all its 
possibilities. With “thrownness” come all the 
attendant anxieties of the self in the face of the 
vast world: the fact that one cannot know things 
in the world with total certainty is itself cause 
for what Heidegger calls Angst.
I suggest that this continual process of 
thought is linked with colonialism for Mäori, 
and propose that the phrase “counter- colonial 
poetics” is just as apt as Heidegger’s Destruktion. 
Counter- colonial thought or poetics, like 
Heidegger’s Destruktion, holds both a critical 
question and a possible response, but it takes 
into account a Mäori metaphysics for doing 
so. A Mäori recounting of metaphysics values 
the void as highly as clarity (Mika, 2012), and 
the void, as much as clarity, imbues things 
in the world. Marsden (2003) observes that 
korekore (Being or voidness) is so thoroughly 
negative that it becomes partially positive. In a 
conceptual sense, this may mean that one can-
not know the void; it exists, and to that extent 
is positive, but it is also beyond our cognition. 
But the void may indeed be speculated on. It is 
paradoxically both material (“thing”) and with-
drawn or absent (“no- thing”). It relates to a 
thing that we perceive, which despite appearing 
before us also contains to itself a hidden aspect. 
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The speculating Mäori self resides among the 
force of this void, which is inextricably linked 
with the presence of a thing, and the void has 
the potential to forever render the thing beyond 
the self’s cognitive reach.
Thus there are repercussions from the void 
for one’s current, contemporary apprehen-
sions and representations of a thing. For other 
indigenous writers, the link between ancient 
metaphysics and ongoing transformation is a 
real one: as Maffi e (n.d.) explains, the primor-
dial force Teotl for the Aztecs “continually 
generates and regenerates as well as permeates, 
encompasses, and shapes the cosmos as part 
of its endless process of self- generation- and- 
regeneration” (n.p.). Deloria (2001) defines 
power as “living energy that inhabits and/or 
composes the universe” (p. 23) and place as 
“the relationship of things to each other”, and 
is clear that they have an interaction such that 
personality itself is “the substantive embodi-
ment, the unique realization, of all the relations 
and power” (p. 145). The phenomena exist 
beyond the self’s comprehension but have bod-
ily consequences for the self.
The proposal that metaphysics is both mate-
rial and void is itself a counter- colonial one. It 
asks, in the fashion of Walter Mignolo (Merrell, 
2006), for an alternative mode of thinking 
that not only poses the void as an antidote to 
presence but also creates a new foundation 
of thinking that encompasses both void and 
presence. We are hence met with Heidegger’s 
(1977) “saving power” which notes that highly 
present, technological thinking exposes its own 
possibilities for further thinking, despite itself: 
it is possible that the metaphysics of presence 
itself has begun the poetics of its own critique. 
In our act of identifying the possibility for 
thought in the metaphysics of presence lies the 
potential for the destabilizing of the solid body 
of assumption that is the metaphysics of pres-
ence—not simply because we are proposing a 
void (and hence an antithesis to presence) but 
because the void has a continual pull on the self. 
The void hence places limits on our certainty of 
an object: the phenomenon whenua (to return 
to our earlier example) is placed beyond our 
horizon of thought, and our representation of 
it takes that concealment into account. But this 
does not preclude our speculation on the draw 
that whenua holds for us through the pull of 
the void. A counter- colonial poetics is hence an 
ethics of uncertainty that calls for our tentative 
questioning around colonizing metaphysics 
and, at the same time, the possibilities of an 
object as it brings us to its attention.
There are some more solid ramifi cations that 
emerge from this poetics. Because we are talking 
about a poetics of caution, there is a limit on our 
knowledge of even the full extent of a colonizing 
problem. Unknowable, however, does not mean 
unthinkable, and it is the obscurity that thought 
points out for the Mäori writer or thinker that 
is important. Counter- colonial thought brings 
back an intention to read an object in terms of 
what it may withhold from us, even where that 
withholding force is thoroughly unknowable. 
It is possibly the darkness behind the glaringly 
evident object that draws us on to continue 
thinking. For that reason, counter- colonial 
poetics, entertaining as it does the withdrawn 
possibilities of an object and its relationship 
with all other things, is a continuous project. 
It may be either an individually sourced one or 
one that asks for collective input. Moreover, 
counter- colonial poetics requires some specula-
tion about itself, and so is the object of its own 
possibility.
Conclusion
How broadly and deeply Mäori intend to inter-
pret the effects of the metaphysics of presence 
is up for Mäori to decide. Any such démarche 
is not, of course, one that Heidegger could—or 
would probably have even wanted to—dictate. 
Where he is indeed useful is in his illumina-
tion of a problem that is itself characterized 
by absence and that tends to swim in and out 
of clarity. For the Mäori speculator on the 
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colonialism of Western metaphysics of pres-
ence, the language that he or she is forced to 
resort to compounds the problem it poses. 
Additionally its implications, I have argued, 
must be accounted for at every step in terms of 
its impact on other things in the world besides 
the self. Although Heidegger can in principle 
indicate that this is necessary, and even pro-
vide Mäori with detail on its origins and its 
general workings, it remains the task of Mäori 
to continuously and critically fl esh out the full 
philosophical and concrete infl uences of what I 
have argued is a persistent horizon of Western 
thought. 
Glossary
German
Destruktion destruction
Grundfrage fundamental question
Mäori
aroaro frontal sensory realm
awa rivers
ia him and/or her
iwi tribe
kau appearance
kaupapa crux
korekore Being
maunga mountains
Papatüänuku Earth Mother
tangata person
tangata 
whenua
original people of the land
te reo Mäori the Mäori language
whakapapa genealogy
whenua land
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